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Abstract
The literature argues that in-kind transfers may have a positive effects on labor
supply. In this paper we use a food and nutrition program implemented in Bogota
(Comedores Comunitarios) to shed light on this issue. The program gives poor people
living near dining rooms, one free meal per-day. Using a matching approach with
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2007 cross-section survey data, both positive and negative
significant effects on female labor supply were found for different groups of women
(differing in age, household composition and access to social networks). These results
are relevant to understand the heterogenous work incentives generated when applying
this type of program.
Keywords food and nutrition programs, female labor supply, in-kind transfers, col-
lective decision.
JEL codes D12, H42, I38, J22.
1 Introduction
Fighting poverty may involve many instruments and there is no consensus about the best
program design. One of the main issues is whether in-kind or cash transfers should be
used. In some cases, an in-kind transfer is preferred as it enables the policy-designers to fix
receptors consumption bundles. For instance, the Government can be sure of the quality
of a lunch, in terms of nutrients and calories, by giving it directly rather than giving its
equivalent in cash. Even though this might drive to an inefficient allocation of resources,
additional consequences may arise. One of the most important is the distortion of labor
supply decisions. Modifications on labor supply may affect long-term consumption paths,
tax revenues and imply social costs. This work studies the effect on female labor supply of
an in-kind food supply program in Bogota, Colombia.
Experience suggests that female labor supply might react more to a food supply pro-
gram than men. First, labor supply is usually more elastic for females than for males 1.
1Some of these results are summarized by Smith and Cogan (1980), Killingsworth and Heckman (1987)
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Second, food related activities in Colombian families are usually part of women’s role in
the household. In consequence, they might be the main beneficiaries of the program since
it not only improves the quality of their food but it might also provide them some time
left.
In order to improve future in-kind programs design, it is important to know if such
programs alter labor supply. Additionally, it is also important to acknowledge the factors
that enhance or inhibit those effects. In this article, we address these questions for the
specific case of Comedores Comunitarios program in Bogota’s beneficiaries: Is the female
labor supply affected by the program?
In this paper we show that the effects of the Comedores Comunitarios Program on
female labor supply are heterogeneous. When we analyze the impact at an aggregate
level, results are small and similar to those found in the previous literature. However, this
changes when specific household groups are analyzed. A positive and significant effect on
labor market participation is found (additional 5 pp.) for married women who live with
other household members. The impact is positive and bigger for older women (about 11
pp. for women between 47 and 55 years old) but it is negative for younger (fewer 9 pp. for
those between 15 and 27 years old).Other characteristics like belonging to a social network,
having additional assistance from other programs, living in a larger household, or being a
wage earner or a self-employed also causes different effects.
The Comedores Comunitarios (communitarian dining rooms) is a program where a
public dining room provides a daily meal to its beneficiaries in Bogota´ (Colombia) city
since 2004. They are selected by local committees and must fulfill some participation
requirements. The program’s main objective is to supplement nearly half of the total
calories and nutrients needed by a person per day. This program gives us the opportunity
to analyze an in-kind transfer program where individuals cannot resell the provided good
(i.e. the in-kind transfer cannot be converted into a cash transfer). In particular, the effect
of such kind of program on female labor supply in a sample from 2007 is considered here.
As far as we know, this is the first article that does an impact evaluation for this program.
The program was described and summarized by Nu´n˜ez and Cuesta (2007), but no causal
inference was done.
Given the current information, it is not possible to identify individual attendance to the
program. Therefore, a wider concept of treatment is used. As the transmission channel
involves household level decisions, a woman is considered as treated if any member of
their household has attended a dining room. Hence, a composite effect is taken into
and Altonji and Blank (1999). However, there are not clear results about the elasticity of Colombian female
labor supply. Robbins and Salinas (2007) observed an increase in Latin-American female labor supply
despite the stability of real wages, as part of a global tendency during the second half of XX century.
Growing female participation on labor market and a demographic change in Colombia was documented
by Tenjo and Ribero (1998), Santamar´ıa and Rojas Delgadillo (2001) among others. Robbins et al. (2009)
argue that such growth in participation could be mainly due to the ’additional worker effect’. This effect is
particularly important for the case of women who are not the household head as Charry L. (2003) points
out.
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account: a direct effect, the individual access to the food, and an indirect effect due to
the participation of other household members. The in-kind transfer has two components:
the food as a physical good and the time not spent preparing food. The interdependence
of each household member budget restrictions must be taken into account: if the income
of one member grew or his expenses were reduced, the consumption patterns of the other
members are likely to change. This notion leads this research to analyze female labor
supply effects in different household structures.
To obtain our results we measure the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
For this purpose, we need to construct the counterfactual for the treatment group on
participation and number of working hours. A counterfactual represents what would have
happened if a treated woman was not treated. In order to reliably measure the impact of
the program over its beneficiaries, the counterfactual units must be as similar as possible
to the treated units. This was done by implementing the matching methodology. It selects
a non-treated subset which is as similar as possible to the treated women group. The ATT
is the difference in labor supply between the averages of the outputs between the treated
units and their counterfactuals units. In particular, the applied matching method is the
nearest neighborhood Mahalanobis metric matching within calipers defined by propensity
score. This procedure and why it was selected will be explained in detail in section 4. The
available information which includes treated and not treated units –controls- come from
the cross section quality of life survey for Bogota´ in 2007, Encuesta de Calidad de Vida
Bogota´ 2007 (ECV07), done by the Colombian Bureau of Statistics (DANE).
The average effects on labor supply of food supplement programs are usually small
and often insignificant. The most studied program is the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in
USA. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) estimate that FSP reduces labor supply of single mothers.
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007) found a similar effect but not significant. Hagstrom
(1996) found that FSP has less effect on married couples than on single persons. Skoufias
and Gonzalez-Cossio (2008) analyzed a food support program in Mexico and found no
effects on both cash and in-kind transfers over labor supply. However, they found effects
on time allocation between agricultural and nonagricultural activities. Bingley and Walker
(2008) studied the effect of UK’s in-kind food transfers on single mothers labor supply.
They found that even though those programs are conditional on working hours, they have
little effect on promoting part-time work. This work addreses the same problem but also
considering additional variables (apart from family composition) that might induce different
reactions of labor supply.
After this introduction, the remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses in-kind transfers. Section 3 presents the program details. Section 4
presents the identification strategy and Section 5 the dataset. Section 6 summarizes the
main results. Section 7 presents the conclusions.
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2 In-kind transfers, cash transfers and labor supply
Currie and Gahvari (2007) argue that economists usually consider in-kind transfers as in-
efficient solutions in terms of redistribution policy compared to cash transfers. In-kind
transfers restrict the portfolio decisions of beneficiaries while they may always receive an
equivalent in money such that they can choose their prefered consumption levels. How-
ever, there are paternalistic arguments to defend such policies2. Essentially, the argument
appeals to the presence of an externality: one group takes specific decisions for another
group that the second would not take alone.
The link between female labor supply and in-kind transfers is determined by the collec-
tive nature of labor supply decision. By affecting consumption of any household member,
the program may change labor supply of other household members. We can think that
there is a familiar budget restriction that includes food, leisure and a nume´raire good. Each
individual in the household makes his choice given an individual restriction that includes
a sharing rule (Chiappori, 1992). That is, the amount of his own income that would be
given or received depending on all members income. Thus, in the short run the program
affects the budget restriction by modifying both food and work force endowments. As a
result, families may change their optimal elections in nume´raire consumption and labor
supply for each member of the household. As they do not need to pay for food, they can
spend the free money either on consumption or leisure. Similarly, as they do not need to
cook, that free time can be used in other activities. The expected sign of the effect on
labor supply can be positive, negative or null. It depends on household composition and
other covariates that might affect the sharing rule and the valuation for food assistance.
We turn to the analyisis of this effect.
It is possible to define a utility function for women depending on leisure, L, food
consumption, F , and a nume´raire, C, all of them normal goods: U(L,F,C). They must
undertake a budget restriction:
wL+ C + pB ≤ w (T −H) + φ (m,W) (1)
The woman’s wage is w and it is a component of a vector including all household
wages W. T is the available time for leisure and work. Work is divided in two activities:
remunerated work, l, and H which is the amount of time devoted to tasks related to food
preparation (ie. cooking, buying supplies, etc.): T = L + l + H. There is a household
non-labor income m, that with wages, jointly define the exogenous sharing rule φ(m,W).
Food consumption can be obtained both from household work, bought from the market,
B, and from the in-kind transfer G, so F = f (H) + B + G. It is important to introduce
2The relation between welfare programas and labor supply has been summarized by Moffitt (2002)
including both theory and empiric results. For the specific case of in-kind transfers, Cremer and Gahvari
(1997) analized the in-kind transfers role on optimal taxation and Leonesio (1988) and Gahvari (1994)
compared them against cash-transfers in terms of labor supply implications. Others outcomes have been
analyzed, for example Meng and Ryan (2010) considered the link with school outcomes.
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another restriction: B > 0: transferred food can be topped up but cannot be sold in a
secondary market. The optimal labor supply depends on wage, exogenous income and the
in-kind amount transferred.
The impact of the program on the labor supply comes from the sign of ∂l
∗
∂G . The
direction of the overall effect is not straightforward. We must take into account the different
scenarios: first, is B = 0? That is, does the program gives the household more or better
food than the one they would buy or prepare without the program? If not, the women
may buy additional food for her household or invest more of her time in preparing it so
the transfer will be equal to a lump sum transfer of value pG. On the other case, if food
preparation and leisuire are substitutes, the total effect could be either positive or negative
(Leonesio, 1988)3. Second, there is a time allocation effect: as G increases F , H could
be reduced to use either on L or l. The free time could be spent either in additional
working hours, that is, on increasing the nume´raire consumption, or in “leisure” activities
like childcare. Note that the sharing rule might be relevant to determine the income effect
and therefore the sign of the effect.
Household composition and women covariates may lead to different effects on sign and
intensity. For instance, the presence or not of small children on the household might
drive to different results: the more children, the more “leisure” time is requiered by the
women; but also more resources are needed for consumption. In this case, we cannot say
anything a priori. Consequently, these kind of covariates must be taken into account.
Additionally, sharing rule may be different for single and married women, but also between
married women with and without children. A single woman may prefer more leisure than
additional consumption whereas a single mother may value additional consumption for her
children more (as her income is more likely to be the unique resource source). Household
decision models, from Becker (1973) to Chiappori (1992), shows that household related
variables are important as women share their income with their husbands, children and
other relatives. Therefore, in our work it is important to differentiate between household
types and women role in their families.
3 The Comedores Comunitarios program
The program is a component of the social policy called Bogota´ Sin Hambre (BSH) [Bogota
without hunger] undertaken in Bogota´ (Colombia) since 2004 under the direction of the
Secretar´ıa Distrital de Integracio´n Social [District Secretariat for Social Integration]. The
main objective of the program is to reduce famine in Bogota´. They argue that an adequate
food is a minimum requirement for life quality and development of personal capacities, so
it is imperative to face hunger as it leads to bad performance in school or work. A lunch
technically designed by nutritionists is given. It represents 35% to 40% of the total calories
3Under this setup, the provision could be also understand as change on a “virtual price”. That is, a
price in which the restricted bundle would be the optimal choice (Neary and Roberts, 1980).
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and nutrients needed by day (SDIS). In January 2007, there were approximately 68.000
attendees in all 20 localidades4 to the program in 241 dining rooms (Bogota´ Mayor, 2007)
-currently there are nearly 146.000 attendees and above 310 dining rooms-.
The program was designed not only to provide food supply, but also to return social
rights to their attendees. In that way, the program seems to be paternalistic as beneficiaries’
food quality consumption is decided by the Government. Their long run objective is that
their attendees will be able to access to labor market and feed themselves and their families
with their own production. The program involves voluntary training programs, citizen
education, and integration activities in order to build social networks in the neighborhood5.
Unfortunately, currently there is no data to undertake a long-run effect analysis. However,
it is possible to analyze the short-run effect of the program. Moreover, Nu´n˜ez and Cuesta
(2007) showed in a survey designed for the program that 71% of the beneficiaries had been
attending for less than a year in the program.
Participation requirements include living or working near one dining room, and having
SISBEN6 level 1 or 2 or living at Estrato7 1 or 28. Priority is given to kids, pregnant
and lactating mothers, senior citizens, handicapped citizens, families in situations of dis-
placement, single-headed families and street dwellers. The selection mechanism works as
follows: when a dining is going to be opened, a call is issued and program facilitators make
a home visit to interested people to verify eligibility according to the rules stated above.
However, Nu´n˜ez and Cuesta (2007) argued that the program beneficiaries were not the
poorest people and there were also press articles about this topic in 2007. There is an
important group of attendees that does not fulfill the main requirements; only 45% of at-
tendees are SISBEN level 1 and 21% SISBEN level 2. 13.4% households do not accomplish
the entry requirements according to ECV07 data. They also found that those attendees
were less educated people on the average. The main activity of one quarter of them is to
work; 26% does not have any characteristc related to priority access; 8% are beneficiaries
of another governmental program. Finally, 97% of them walk less than 10 minutes to the
4Bogota´ is divided in twenty administrative sections called localidades.
5A goal of the program is to obtain resources from a productive project. That is, a profitable activity
where attendees might obtain experience. It is not compulsive to attend to meetings, trainings or to
participate in any productive project. Initially, those projects were going to be funded using a voluntary fee
paid by the attendees, $300 pesos, that is, aproximately 1.5 dollar cents. However, in 2009 Bogota´’s major
decided to suspend the fee due to incorrect managment of those resources. In August 2010 a vote was held
in the dining rooms for select the projects in which to invest the collected money since 2006. Therefore, it
is not possible to analyze yet the impact of this component.
6Sistema de Identificacio´n de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales: Identification system of
potential social program beneficiaries. It is a life quality measure (Gamboa et al., 2000) that gives a score
that define different levels of vulnerability: those levels are used by the government to define access to
public assistance programs.
7Bogota´ is divided in six estratos differing in average earnings, neighborhood amenities and land value.
That classification is used to define public service tariffs.
8Nu´n˜ez and Cuesta (2007) talk just about SISBEN 1 o 2.However, on the SDIS web page, being Estrato
1 or 2 is also an option.
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dining room.
Eligibility process involves the analysis of a form called SIRBE ( Sistema de Informacio´n
para Registro de Beneficiarios de la SDIS ), a standardized registry for beneficiaries of
the SDIS programs. It includes information about the housing type, home ownership,
overcrowding, SISBEN index, average income, food consumption habits, marital status,
education level and status, pregnant status, handicap status, ethnic group, familiar support
and other kind of public or private aids. Moreover, the SIRBE form is designed for a whole
household: it is centered on familiar dynamics and it must be fulfilled with each member
information even for those who are not going to be in the program. The SIRBE data is
analyzed by a local committee; therefore, there is not a unified score that determines the
participation status.
4 Identification Strategy
Selection bias due to beneficiaries’ selection mechanism is the main issue when constructing
a good reference group. The literature on impact evaluation has different methodologies
to solve this problem. Matching will be used in order to identify the ATT. If we let W
represent the treatment with W = 1 meaning that an observation is beneficiary of the
program and W = 0 that it is not a beneficiary, Y (W ) represent the outcome and X a
vector of covariates, the ATT is given by
θ = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|W = 1, X]. (2)
In order to estimate the parameter θ, we need to build up the counterfactual. As it is
impossible to observe both potential outcomes for the same individual, matching proce-
dure find a control group such that E[Y (0)|W = 1, X] = E[Y (0)|W = 0, X]. Which is
equivalent to E[E[Y (0)|X]|W = 1] = E[E[Y (0)|X]|W = 0]. The identifying assumption
of this procedure is Y (1), Y (0) ⊥ T |f(X), where f(X) is any function defined on X. This
implies that covariates are independent from the treatment status; this is called the balance
property: E[X|W = 1] = E[X|W = 0].
The identifiying assumption of matching relies on the balance property. This property
is checked here by comparing treatment and control units means on each covariate by a
simple t statistic. Additionally, the Standardized Bias (SB) suggested by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985) is reported to look at the differences of the differences in each covariate before
and after the matching. It is defined as follows:
SB =
E[X|W = 1]− E[X|W = 0]√
1
2 (V ar[X|W = 1] + V ar[X|W = 0])
(3)
To match units we will use the nearest neighbor Mahalanobis metric matching within
calipers defined by the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This method is a
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mix between two matching methods: nearest neighborhood matching within the calipers
and Mahalanobis matching. It proceeds in two stages: first, the propensity score is calcu-
lated and a first group is selected using the caliper. A unit will be chosen if its difference
in terms of the propensity score is smaller than the caliper. Second, a Mahalanobis nearest
neighbor matching with replacement on covariates is done, including the propensity score
as a matching covariate9. This routine was implemented by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) compared the nearest neighbor on the PS, Mahalanobis
Metric Matching including the PS and the nearest neighbor Mahalanobis metric matching
within calipers defined by the propensity score. They show the last method produces the
best results in terms of balancing property.
Once we obtain the matched sample, three methods were used based on the weighting
procedure for estimating the ATT.
The first method is the standard non-parametric estimator: a Difference of Means
(DM) within each household composition group. For N1 treated observations and N0
control units, the ATT estimator10 is:
θˆ (N1, N0) =
1
N1
N1∑
i=1:Wi=1
Yi −
∑N0
i=1:Wi=0
Yi∑N0
i=1:Wi=0
eˆ(Xi)
1−eˆ(Xi)
. (4)
The second method is a weighted least squares regression using robust errors with
controls within each group in order to control for remaining bias after the matching. It is
called Regression with Controls (RC) and is formally defined as:
Y = θˆW + βX + e. (5)
The last method includes all the groups in which the sample is divided. This was done
in order to obtain additional degrees of freedom. For I household composition groups the
estimator for each group i, θˆGi , came from the weighted linear regression. It is called Full
Regression with Controls (FRC) and is formally defined as:
Y =
I∑
i=1
[
θˆGi (Gi ∗W ) + γ ∗Gi
]
+ βX + e (6)
where Gi is a dummy for each group. The household composition groups are defined in
the next section.
9For futher details on these methods you can check Rubin (2006) which includes Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985)
10Abadie and Imbens (2006) showed that in nearest-neighbor procedures, bootstrapping is generally not
valid. Therefore, standard error is calculated assuming independence, fixed weights and homokedasticity.
V ar (θ (N1, N0)) =
1
N1
V ar(Y |W = 1) + 1
N21
N0∑
(iWi=0)
(
eˆ (Xi)
1− eˆ (Xi)
)
2V ar(Y |W = 0)
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The probability to participate in the labor market (Participation Decision) and the
number of working hours per week (Weekly Working Hours) are the two main outcomes
analyzed. Participation decision is defined as to be doing any paid activity or to be seeking
a job. Weekly working hours are the total reported hours of labor activity during a week.
The former outcome is analyzed only for those who were reported as employed in the same
activity since 2005. It was done in order to have a proxy of the effect on women who were
working before the program full implementation. Otherwise, senior employees would be
confused with new employees that were influenced in their participation decision by the
program. As both groups face different decisions and restrictions that are relevant for this
analysis, this restriction is necessary.
5 Data
We use the ECV2007 wich was designed for Bogota´ by the DANE and it is representative
by localidad in each estrato. The survey has 26,585 household observations. Two household
questions of the survey are related to the program: the first, if household’s head knows the
existence of the program (72.21%); the second, if at least one household member attended
the program (1,275 households, 6.78% from those who positively answered the former
question).
The dataset is restricted to women aged and over 15 who are household heads or his
spouse. At the end, 22,939 households were considered (86.3%). 4 households we excluded
due to the absence of educational information and 203 as a result of home ownership
missing data. Another restriction was done: estratos 4, 5 and 6 were excluded as they
are not beneficiaries of the program (35 treated households were excluded as a result).
Therefore the final number of observations is 18,750 where 1,108 of them are treated units
(87% of the original 1,275 beneficiary households). 494 of them were working and 9 were
excluded as there no information about job seniority was provided. From these, 217 were
working in the same activity before January 2005. In terms of individuals, those 1.108
households correspond to 4,565 individuals (relatives of the household-head), while the 217
households involves 904 individuals.
The selection of covariates set is probably the most crucial decision in a matching
approach. According to Dehejia and Wahba (1999), results might be highly sensitive to
the set of covariates. The covariates must be important for the outcome but also for
explaining the propensity to be treated. Additionally, they must not be affected by the
treatment status (Imbens, 2004).
Most of the selected covariates are part of the SIRBE form so they are directly related
to the selection decision of the program. Here they are grouped in five categories: woman,
husband, household composition, and quality of life conditions. In order to analyze the
sensibility of the estimation, results are presented including each set of covariates step by
step. Those covariates are listed in table 1. The quality of life index construction is detailed
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on the appendix.
Most of these variables are relevant for labor participation decisions, but some of the
usual were excluded 11. This is the case of the presence of other unemployed individuals
and household income; those variables could be also explained by treatment status so they
must be omitted. In the case of working hours, variables like economic sector wages were
excluded due to the same reason.
As said, we analyze participation decision and working hours. For the working hours
analysis the sample was restricted to women who had been working in the same occupation
since January 2005. The idea is to analyze only women who had already a job before they
entered to the program. Otherwise, information about women who decided to participate
on the labor market due to the program could be introducing a bias on the estimations.
As we can see on figure 2(b), the quality of life index distributions of the treated and
untreated groups overlap, there are no discontinuities. It also happens with the other
continuous covariates as can be seen on figure 2. In particular, it seems that the program
beneficiaries who are also receptors of other kind of programs transfers are not very different
from the control group.
Covariates relevance was also checked. Table 2 resume the regressions of the treatment
and the two outcomes against the covariates. The following covariates are not significant
in any regression: calamity, chronic disease, change of residence and another handicapped
presence. Specifications including and excluding those covariates will be taken into account.
Household composition groups are defined depending on the marital status of the self-
reported household head. This is done in order to take into account the presence of potential
income earners that will share it with their household. Even though this criterion enables
to split the sample in further groups than the marital status (for example, the presence of
older children), the following classification was done in order to ensure the sample size for
each one.
1. Single: Women who live alone
2. Couple: Women who live only with their spouse
3. Single-Head: Women who are the household head and do not live with their spouse
4. Couple-Head: Women who are either the household head or the spouse of the
household head
There is another important reason for differences in labor supply reaction: there are
differences between the woman covariates within those groups as can be seen in tables 3
and 4.
Before presenting the matching process results, tables 3 and 4 information must be
complemented. Tables 5 and 6 present the differences between control and treated groups
11See Posada and Arango (2003) and Arango and Posada (2007) for the principal determinants of female
labor supply in Colombia.
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per household group and the associated standardized bias. In all cases, there are significant
differences in key variables like age and years of education. The matching procedure goal
is to reduce them to insignificance. In that way, the treatment and control groups would
be comparable.
6 Estimation
In this section we present the results of our estimations. First, we present results about
the balance property of the matching procedure. Then we present the results about the
effect of the program on female labor supply. Finally we present some robustness checks
of our results.
6.1 Balance Property
The main objective of matching procedures is to ensure balance. Tables 5 and 6 present
the differences for each covariate between control and treatment groups before and after
matching. It includes the significance level for a difference of means test, the SB as defined
by equation (3) and the SB percentage reduction. As can be seen, all differences in each
household group are insignificant after applying the matching procedure.
A good illustration of matching quality is the density of the propensity score for control
and treatment groups before and after the matching. Figure 1 shows those kernel densities
by each outcome (as the working hours sample is a subset of the participation decision
one and as it includes further controls). The densities for the matching for the specific
household groups are presented on figures 3 and 4. In all cases the quality of the process
can be seen: the propensity scores before matching are notoriously different but are very
similar after it. Additionally, at first sight common support seems to be assured. In fact,
using a caliper of 0.01, all treated observations are included for participation decision and
3 are lost in the weekly working hours’ specification. In both cases the balance property
seems to be achieved in all variables as no significant mean difference remains. Moreover,
most of the standardized bias are below 5%, as usual empirical studies (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2005). Those results can be found in table 38 for participation decision and in
table 43 for working hours. Along this paper, different variations of the matching procedure
are implemented and presented. Their respective balance property tables are presented on
the additional tables section on the appendix C.3.
6.2 Main results
Our main results comprise three types of estimations. First, we estimate the effect of the
program on aggregate labor supply. Second, we allow the response of female labor supply
to the program to differ with the household type. Third, we allow the effect to differ with
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covariates presented in section 5. Finally we allow the effect to differ in both household
types and other covariates.
6.2.1 General results
Table 7 present the DM and RC estimators as defined by equations (4) and (5) for the
ATT on the overall group. A positive effect on the participation decision and a negative
one on working hours are presented. However, those effects are small and not significant.
What we are going to see is that the impact of the program is heterogeneous as it
depends of the type of household analyzed. Heterogenous effects are found when the
impact is measured in some specific households. Next, results are presented differencing by
household composition groups, cohorts, family size, presence of children, years of education,
change of residence, presence of other transferences and SISBEN level, and the type of work
and seniority (only for working hours).
6.2.2 Household Composition
Table 8 presents the same results discriminating by household composition. It is just as
the previous table but includes the FRC estimator as defined by equation (6). In this case,
significant results at 10% level are found for the Couple-Head group, about 5 additional
pp. The FRC estimator leads to a significant effect on Couple working hours. However, the
Single and Couple groups’ effects are difficult to analyze as they involve a small number of
treated observations: when they are included in the huge regression of FRC the variance
structure changes enough for displaying this result.
6.2.3 Covariates Groups
Table 11 to 18 desegregate the overall effect into different individual and household covari-
ates. Those results are presented in detail next.
Table 11 and 15 reports the effect for different cohorts. The cutoffs are defined by the
availability of the number of observations en each case. Only the last cutoff was imposed
in both cases as 55 years was the retirement age. In this case, both positive and negative
significant effects are found. The youngest women of the sample are participating less
in the labor market: about 9 fewer pp. On the other hand, women who are close to
retirement age obtain 12 additional pp. Younger women are in an earlier life cycle so
they might desire more leisure than additional consumption: they may want to spend time
with their children (education and guidance) or for their own education for instance. The
same pattern cannot be seen on working hours. As a result, when a program like this is
introduced, age differences seem to be relevant for deciding the participation or not of the
women on the labor market but not changing their labor supply decision when they have
been working previously.
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Household composition variables are also relevant (see tables 12 and 16). Larger families
drive to a notorious positive impact on participation decision: families with five or more
members have 15 additional pp. The same pattern is not as clear for working hours’
decision: a positive impact is found for families with three members but it is not robust
to the estimator. This can be understood in two ways: first, as a higher income is needed
with larger families, additional consumption might be preferred to leisure; second, as there
are more people available to work, women may concentrate on home related activities
rather than on working. The presence of children has a different impact. The participation
decision seems to be decreasing with a higher percentage of under-twelve, while a clear and
huge negative impact on working hours is found for households with a higher number of
small children: around 11 fewer working hours per week for families with small children
are equal or more than 80%. In this case, household activities requires more attention so
the time is not used in increasing the income but in childcare and similar activities.
At first sight, variables related with personal abilities seem to be not as relevant as the
household ones (see tables 13 and 17). There is no pattern when using years of education.
When seniority is analyzed, the impact seems to be negative and decreasing for women
who have fewer months in the same activity. However, no significant effects were found
probably due to dataset restrictions. All women included in this analysis have been working
for more than two years in the same activity. There might be differences for women who
have spent less time in the same activity which gives them a smaller activity change cost.
Tables 14 and 18 split the effect in a final set of covariates. Being part of an established
social network seems to aid them to enter into the labor market: those women who had not
change their residence since 2003 augmented their participation in nearly 3 pp. This is not
the same for working hours: the social network effect is related more to the possibility to
access to the labor market rather than on marginal changes on labor supply. Of particular
importance is whether the family receives other transferences as it seems to be hitting the
labor supply in different directions. A slightly and not robust positive result is found for
participation decision, but a negative one is found for women who were already working.
In the former case, they can work less as an external aid is coming. However, no woman
decides to leave her job at all. The key to this might be related to SISBEN level: it does
not have any impact on working hours’ decision but it is relevant for participation decision.
An important difference is given by the type of work: wage earners often cannot change
their labor supply as easy as self-employees. This is clear in table 18 where self-employees
reduce by 8 hours their supply while wage earners not. A clear conclusionresults: if one
desires to design a program with low effects on labor supply, it should be targeted to
employees as they cannot easily answer as self-employees. On the other cases, policy
makers should take into account the impact on labor supply as it could be considerable, as
we can see in these results.
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6.2.4 Covariates within household groups
Our previous results show us the heterogeneous impact of the program when analyzing
some characteristics. However, those effects are enhanced by the combination of some of
those characteristics. Tables 19 to 26 explore the same covariates of the former tables but
for the two bigger household composition groups. Results are mostly the same but more
intense.
By cohorts (tables 19 and 23), the impact on Couple-Head women close to retirement
age is huge: nearly 24 additional pp. For the Single-Head case, the impact on younger
women is also noticeable: 14 fewer pp. But we also found an increment of 11 pp. for
women in retirement age. Hence, it is not only a matter of being younger or older but the
combination with the household composition.
By household covariates (tables 20 and 24), the impact follows as similar heterogeneous
pattern. By household size, Single-Head impact is negative for smaller families and positive
for the bigger. However, these results have a high variance. For Couple-Head, the two forces
behind previously described are visible here: in a small household the impact could be even
negative, but it becomes positive with a bigger household. However, for very big families,
the impact is again negative. For children under 12 participation in the household, there
is no clear pattern for Couple-Head but there is for Single-Head. Women living alone with
small children are highly discouraged to work if they found additional income sources.
However, if their household is big, they still need to work. In their cases, the relative size
of the transfers is relevant for determining the impact of the program.
Finally, under the final set of covariates (tables 22 and 26), for Single-Head the impact
does not change enough to be noticed. That is not the case of Couple-Head households.
Women who live longer on the neighborhood and probably have a better social network,
work more after being treated: the effect is positive and with small variance (significant at
5% level) while the impact could be negative for incoming women. The presence of other
transferences enhances a little the impact.
6.3 Robustness Checks
Results are robust to matching methodology and to covariates specification. Two alterna-
tive methodologies with similar results are presented. As mentioned, covariates specifica-
tion is crucial and may drive to different coefficients. Our results stand this test.
Table 9 and 10 present 5 different specifications given the included covariates (these
groups are explained in table 1). The first includes only the women covariates and no
significant effect is found: for Couple-Head the coefficient is negative as for the other groups
for the participation decision case. When including husband covariates, the differences
are reduced for all groups and for Couple-Head the coefficients became positive. The
third specification which includes household composition variables drives to the highest
coefficients for Couple-Head, about additional 7 pp. and significant at 5% level (1% for RC
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estimator) while the sign becomes unclear for the working hours outcome. Specification 4
includes quality of life variables and the coefficients for CM and RC for the participation
decision case fall to 6 pp. The FRC estimator falls to 4pp but is not significant even at
5% level. Again, the result for working hours is ambiguous. Finally, when selecting the
relevant covariates as described on the identification strategy section, the coefficients for
DM and RC fall to 5.5 pp. at 10% level and FRC keep on 4pp but it is still non-significant.
For working hours, all three estimators drive positive bur remain unsignificant. From this
exercise we can emphasise the relevance of the covariates groups:, household composition
variables like household size and the presence of kids are relevant for the women response
to the in-kind transfer.
Other matching methodologies were also tried in order to very the results. The coars-
ened exact matching procedure (CEM) from Iacus et al. (2009) and the nearest neighbor
matching across the variables from Abadie et al. (2004) results are presented in table 27 for
the case of participation decision outcome . The CEM procedure, which garantees balanced
outcomes, included only 225 observations from the 1108 available for the participation de-
cision12. Abadie et al. (2004) procedure allows observations to be included more than
once. The results are similiar in all methods, in particular for the Couple-Head result. For
both PS Mahalanobis and the covariates matching, the estimators are significant at 10%
significance level. The CEM estimate is close in terms of coefficient but is not significant,
probably because of the small sample size involved in the method.
A final robustness check is done by including the ECV2003 data in order to use a
placebo methodology to check the reliability of the matching methodology. That is, we
checked if there were differences before the program start. As we do not have panel data, a
“treatment”group was constructed using the most accurate matching methodology between
2003 and 2007 data. In order to implement this placebo test, two steps are required: first,
to obtain the treatment group in 2003; second, to do the matching procedure in 2003. For
the first step, the treatment group in ECV2007 was matched with ECV2003 data using the
subset of covariates that are present in both datasets. As we need a treatment group as
similar as possible, the CEM procedure was implemented. This matched subset in ECV2003
is now considered as the new treatment group for the matching “before” the program. In
the second step, the same matching procedure used on the main results is applied to the
2003 data. Table 28 summarizes the first step: prematching and postmatching balance. As
can be observed, the matching quality is good for the included covariates but half of the
original ECV2007 treated observations were not matched. Table 29 presents the results of
the second step. For the Single, there is a positive effect that is significant at 10% level.
For all the other groups, the effect is not significant. Hence, our results are robust for
groups other than Single13.
12For the weely working hours outcome, only 17 observations were included in the CEM procedure. As
a results, the summarizing table is not presented here.
13This test was also done using Mahalanobis Nearest Neighborhood Matching within the Calipers for
step 1. As a result, more observations were included for the step 2. Results were the same but with bigger
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7 Conclusions
Comedores Comunitarios attendees give us the opportunity to analyze an in-kind transfer
program effect on labor supply. Often, food and nutrition programs have negative effects
on labor supply. However, in this case, both significant positive and negative effects were
found depending on the type of householdt. We have shown that labor supply reacts in
different ways to alternative combination of covariates that define different family patterns.
If policy makers want to prevent distortions (or enhance some effects) of this type of
programs, they should make emphasis in complementary programs for those particular kind
of families. Hence, the program design must involve not only the food, but also promote
access and attendance to other facilities like childcare, work training and education.
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A Main Tables
A.1 Descriptive Information
Table 1: Covariates
Group Variable Description Relevant
Woman Age
(D) Ethnic pertinence Indigenous groups, San Andre´s raizal,
ROM or afro community.
X
Years of Education X
(D) Handicapped Presence of any physical limitation that
which affects daily performance.
X
(D) Economic Sector (Only on Working Hours as out-
come)ISIC Classification: Agriculture,
Mines and energy, Industry, Construc-
tion, Commerce, Tourism and restau-
rants, Transport and Communication,
Finance, Real Estate, Government, Ed-
ucation, Health, Other social sectors,
Other services.
X
Husband Age X
Years of Education X
(D) Handicapped Presence of any physical limitation that
which affects daily performance
X
Household (D) Calamity To be affected on the past year by
theft, homicidal, kidnapping, extortion
or eviction.
(D) Chronic Disease To have a person with a chronic disease
in the household.
Under 12 Percentage of under 12 in the house-
hold.
X
(D) Other Handicapped Presence of any other handicapped per-
son.
X
Household Size X
Quality of Life (D) Non tenant To be the owners of their home or to be
occupying it without paying it.
X
(D) SISBEN level 1 or 2 To have a member on the household
with a Sisben level 1 or 2.
X
Other Transfer. per cap. Amount of transferences by other social
programs per capita.
X
Quality of Life Index An aggregate numeric valuation con-
structed with categorical household
amenities.
X
(D) Change of residence To have had changed of residence since
2003.
(D): Dummy variable
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Table 2: Covariates relevance
Variables Participation Decision Weekly Working Hours
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Treatment Outcome Treatment Outcome
Woman Age -0.0154*** -0.0496*** -0.0133 -0.133***
(0.00357) (0.00196) (0.0100) (0.0404)
Woman Years of Edu. -0.0996*** 0.0999*** -0.0788*** -0.138
(0.0100) (0.00481) (0.0231) (0.0875)
Handicapped Woman 0.172 -0.348*** 0.390 -1.550
(0.133) (0.0799) (0.331) (2.021)
Ethnic 0.360* -0.0759 0.271 0.107
(0.206) (0.125) (0.486) (2.027)
Husband Age 0.00124 0.0127*** 0.0149 0.00784
(0.00394) (0.00206) (0.0109) (0.0424)
Husband Years of Edu. -0.0476*** 0.0140*** -0.0482* -0.162
(0.0120) (0.00531) (0.0276) (0.0991)
Handicapped Husband 0.273* 0.128 0.596* -4.945**
(0.162) (0.0943) (0.346) (2.124)
Calamity 0.0911 0.0285 0.149 0.125
(0.0913) (0.0516) (0.209) (0.931)
Chronic Disease 0.0509 -0.0588 0.0469 0.515
(0.0724) (0.0371) (0.166) (0.646)
No tenant -0.164** -0.203*** -0.215 -1.825***
(0.0723) (0.0364) (0.162) (0.611)
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.770*** -0.0156 0.901*** -0.727
(0.0677) (0.0380) (0.165) (0.796)
Other Transfer. 0.681*** 0.433*** 0.862*** 0.241
(0.0762) (0.0400) (0.176) (0.685)
Quality of Life Index -0.0153** 0.00448 -0.0276 -0.0555
(0.00758) (0.00562) (0.0177) (0.117)
Percentage of under 12 0.833*** -1.453*** 0.000885 -2.983*
(0.202) (0.109) (0.458) (1.713)
Other handicapped 0.206* -0.0646 -0.0986 -0.628
(0.115) (0.0683) (0.286) (1.433)
Household Size 0.0314 0.0192 0.122** -0.0301
(0.0230) (0.0135) (0.0510) (0.257)
Have changed residence 0.101 0.0303 -0.282 -0.553
(0.0750) (0.0404) (0.191) (0.688)
Single Woman 0.341 1.716*** 0.770 -1.523
(0.307) (0.161) (0.841) (2.927)
Couple living alone 0
Woman as Household Head -0.351 1.977*** 0.402 0.160
(0.275) (0.140) (0.734) (2.630)
Couple as Household Head -0.339** 0.0386 -0.148 1.018
(0.156) (0.0691) (0.416) (1.316)
Observations 18.754 18.754 4.150 4.172
R-squared 0.045
Robust standard errors in parentheses for IV. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Economic sector not reported but they are included on columns 3 and 4
I, II and III are logistic regressions. IV is an OLS regression.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Participation Decision
Single Couple Woman Head Couple Head Sample
n =
61
n =
977
n =
63
n =
1563
n =
348
n =
4742
n =
636
n =
10364
n =
1108
n =
17646
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Participation Decision 0.43 0.59 0.35 0.51 0.69 0.67 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.56
Woman Age 60.97 52.41 49.56 44.76 44.40 48.89 38.32 40.45 42.11 43.76
Woman Years of Edu. 5.25 9.26 6.05 9.13 6.19 8.54 7.03 9.08 6.61 8.95
Handicapped Woman 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05
Ethnic 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Husband Age 54.78 48.94 42.86 44.28 27.71 30.35
Husband Years of Edu. 5.54 9.10 6.76 9.01 4.20 6.10
Handicapped Husband 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03
No tenant 0.52 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.42 0.58 0.50 0.55 0.47 0.56
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.52 0.16 0.43 0.19 0.63 0.31 0.54 0.27 0.56 0.27
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.63 0.30 0.62 0.36 0.55 0.30
Quality of Life Index 56.24 56.48 56.34 57.30 57.45 57.45 57.40 57.74 57.29 57.55
Percentage of under 12 0.28 0.18 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.18
Other handicapped 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06
Household Size 3.90 3.42 4.82 4.34 4.16 3.70
Single Woman 0.06 0.06
Couple living alone 0.06 0.09
Woman as Household Head 0.31 0.27
Couple as Household Head 0.57 0.59
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Source: Own calculations
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Weekly Working Hours
Single Couple Woman Head Couple Head Sample
n =
7
n =
217
n =
8
n =
283
n =
83
n =
1354
n =
110
n =
2110
n =
208
n =
3964
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Weekly Working Hours 38.12 48.33 42.71 47.90 47.99 48.53 47.75 48.04 47.32 48.20
Woman Age 47.59 42.05 40.35 36.36 40.07 42.16 38.69 38.06 39.61 39.46
Woman Years of Edu. 6.35 11.34 7.53 11.41 6.71 9.62 7.63 10.12 7.22 10.14
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02
Ethnic 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Mines and energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.29 0.13 0.29 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17
Construction 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Commerce 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.21
Tourism and restrnts. 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
Transport and Comm. 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Finance 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Real Estate 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
Government 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Education 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
Health 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
Other social sector 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Other services 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.09
Husband Age 46.71 40.62 43.20 41.69 24.81 25.88
Husband Years of Edu. 7.47 10.77 7.08 9.70 4.06 6.13
Handicapped Husband 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02
No tenant 0.65 0.38 0.29 0.39 0.32 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.42 0.48
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.24 0.14 0.47 0.16 0.61 0.30 0.52 0.24 0.54 0.25
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.71 0.35 0.65 0.38 0.63 0.32
Quality of Life Index 56.57 56.48 56.45 57.43 57.79 57.49 57.24 57.76 57.40 57.57
Percentage of under 12 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.19
Other handicapped 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05
Household Size 3.98 3.31 4.81 4.25 4.25 3.58
Single Woman 0.04 0.06
Couple living alone 0.04 0.08
Woman as Household Head 0.39 0.32
Couple as Household Head 0.54 0.54
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Source: Own calculations
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A.2 Estimation Outputs
Table 7: Full Sample
Participation Decision Weekly Working Hours
DM RC DM RC
All Sample 0.0144 0.0125 −2.0049 −1.3034
(0.0220) (0.0203) (2.1466) (2.1140)
T/Obs 1108/2134 1108/2134 205/397 205/397
Controls X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Tr: Included treated observations. Obs: Total included observations.
Source: Own calculations
Table 8: Main Results by Household Composition
Participation Decision Weekly Working Hours
DM RC FRC DM RC FRC
Single −0.0328 −0.0523 −0.0368 −15.4000 −18.3533 −15.7412
(0.0921) (0.0791) (0.0838) (9.9025) (0.0000) (9.9385)
Tr/Obs 61/120 61/120 1102/2123 5/10 5/10 192/369
Couple −0.0339 −0.0751 −0.0506 −6.0000 4.4629 −6.1774
(0.0907) (0.0786) (0.0789) (10.4642) (0.0000) (9.2504)
Tr/Obs 59/117 59/117 1102/2123 5/10 5/10 192/369
Single-Head −0.0376 −0.0233 −0.0282 −2.8250 −2.4755 −2.4919
(0.0365) (0.0306) (0.0313) (3.2900) (3.3345) (3.2185)
Tr/Obs 346/654 346/654 1102/2123 80/154 80/154 192/369
Couple-Head 0.0566∗ 0.0566 ∗ ∗ 0.0580∗ 2.4190 2.9701 2.7323
(0.0289) (0.0283) (0.0286) (3.2284) (3.3009) (3.2451)
Tr/Obs 636/1232 636/1232 1102/2123 105/198 105/198 192/369
Controls X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Tr: Included treated observations. Obs: Total included observations.
Source: Own calculations
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A.3 Analysis by covariates
A.3.1 Participation Decision
Table 11: Overall effect on Participation Decision by Cohorts
Couple-Head
Age DM RC Obs
15-27 −0.0947∗ −0.0899∗ 169
(0.0564) (0.0528)
27-32 −0.0360 −0.0416 139
(0.0599) (0.0538)
32-37 0.0800 0.0747 150
(0.0566) (0.0540)
37-41 0.0000 −0.0126 137
(0.0603) (0.0580)
41-47 0.0000 0.0145 161
(0.0548) (0.0519)
47-55 0.1172∗∗ 0.1322∗∗ 145
(0.0588) (0.0570)
55-97 0.0553 0.0644 199
(0.0441) (0.0406)
All Cohorts 0.014 0.013 1108
(0.022) (0.020)
11 observations were lost due to common support.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 12: Overall effect on Participation Decision by Household Covariates
Household Size Under 12
2 −0.023 −0.023 132 0.0 − 33.3 0.040 0.035 375
(0.063) (0.051) (0.037) (0.033)
3 −0.043 −0.041 231 33.3 − 50.0 0.012 0.018 400
(0.047) (0.043) (0.036) (0.034)
4 0.039 0.038 256 50.0 − 83.3 0.013 0.025 227
(0.045) (0.042) (0.049) (0.046)
5+ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 197 83.3 − . −0.051 0.007 98
(0.052) (0.049) (0.077) (0.061)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 13: Overall effect on Participation Decision by Work-Related Covariates
Years of Education
0 − 5 0.031 0.042 554
(0.032) (0.029)
6 − 10 −0.007 0.001 282
(0.042) (0.041)
11 0.011 −0.004 187
(0.052) (0.048)
+11 0.063 0.055 80
(0.074) (0.070)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 14: Overall effect on Participation Decision by Other Covariates
Change of Residence Other Transferences Sisben 1 or 2
DM RC Obs DM RC Obs DM RC Obs
No 0.0386 0.0398∗ 777 −0.0061 −0.0149 493 0.0103 0.0085 485
(0.0261) (0.0238) (0.0326) (0.0301) (0.0326) (0.0299)
Yes −0.0483 −0.0524 331 0.0344 0.0469∗ 611 0.0483 0.0493∗ 621
(0.0397) (0.0373) (0.0295) (0.0281) (0.0299) (0.0276)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
A.3.2 Working Hours
Table 15: Overall effect on Weekly Working Hours by Cohorts
Couple-Head
Age DM RC Obs
17-35 0.5319 2.0147 47
(4.4184) (4.7485)
35-41 −2.9730 −0.3189 37
(4.6160) (5.4299)
41-46.5 3.2821 4.9099 39
(5.2584) (5.9690)
46.5-55 −2.8000 0.2554 50
(4.0745) (4.4905)
55-89 −4.9474 −3.3710 19
(7.2038) (12.1949)
All Cohorts −2.005 −1.303 205
(2.147) (2.114)
11 observations were lost due to common support.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 16: Overall effect on Weekly Working Hours by Household Covariates
Household Size Under 12
2 −6.294 −8.659 17 0.0 − 25.0 0.744 1.121 82
(6.100) (5.115) (3.263) (3.319)
3 3.489 8.478∗ 45 25.0 − 40.0 0.756 0.390 45
(4.057) (4.326) (5.005) (5.181)
4 −6.556 −6.921 45 40.0 − 80.0 −3.947 −1.370 38
(4.258) (4.671) (5.359) (5.898)
5+ 1.136 1.651 81 80.0 − . −11.333∗∗ −14.860∗∗ 30
(3.487) (3.660) (4.729) (5.883)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 17: Overall effect on Weekly Working Hours by Work-Related Covariates
Years of Education Seniority
0 − 5 −4.229 −4.606 96 31-49 −3.460 −3.448 50
(3.367) (3.706) (4.278) (4.862)
6 − 10 −2.610 −3.520 41 49-96 −2.411 −2.416 56
(5.244) (5.407) (4.540) (5.100)
11 4.243 2.494 37 96-153 0.295 2.414 44
(4.034) (4.987) (4.331) (4.907)
+11 −3.333 −2.907 24 153-720 0.902 0.869 51
(5.292) (5.422) (4.128) (5.065)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 18: Overall effect on Weekly Working Hours by Other Covariates
Change of Residence Other Transferences Sisben 1 or 2 Wage Earner
DM RC Obs DM RC Obs DM RC Obs DM RC Obs
No −1.1728 −0.0596 162 0.2530 1.1293 83 −3.3750 −3.6371 88 −7.9211∗−8.5929∗ 76
(2.5778) (2.5171) (2.7876) (2.9305) (3.1323) (3.2376) (4.4726) (4.4770)
Yes 0.6667 −2.9460 39 −3.1967 −2.5188 122 −3.2069 −2.1378 116 0.0000 0.0377 119
(4.7423) (5.6300) (2.9850) (3.2348) (3.0393) (2.8673) (2.2518) (2.2233)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
A.3.3 Participation Decision for Single-Head
Table 19: Effect on Participation Decision for Single-Head by Cohorts
Couple-Head
Age DM RC Obs
15-29 −0.1458∗ −0.1437 48
(0.0791) (0.0993)
29-35 0.0889 0.1044 45
(0.0718) (0.0764)
35-40 0.0000 0.0013 54
(0.0634) (0.0736)
40-44 −0.0789 −0.0906 38
(0.0802) (0.0781)
44-49 −0.0952 −0.0789 42
(0.0906) (0.0927)
49-55 0.0455 0.0884 44
(0.1069) (0.1060)
55-97 0.1111 0.1174∗ 63
(0.0729) (0.0662)
All Cohorts −0.038 −0.023 346
(0.036) (0.031)
11 observations were lost due to common support.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 20: Effect on Participation Decision for Single-Head by Household Covariates
Household Size Under 12
3 −0.100 −0.100 70 0.0 − 33.3 0.017 −0.007 115
(0.084) (0.064) (0.067) (0.054)
4 −0.049 −0.045 102 33.3 − 50.0 −0.027 −0.013 111
(0.067) (0.057) (0.061) (0.050)
5 −0.057 −0.028 70 50.0 − 83.3 −0.157∗∗ −0.130∗ 70
(0.072) (0.065) (0.076) (0.069)
6+ 0.102 0.084 49 83.3 − . −0.087 −0.077 46
(0.102) (0.080) (0.096) (0.089)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 21: Effect on Participation Decision for Single-Head by Work-Related Covariates
Years of Education
0 − 5 −0.026 0.002 193
(0.053) (0.042)
6 − 10 −0.049 −0.032 81
(0.065) (0.062)
11 −0.070 −0.069 43
(0.075) (0.071)
+11 0.000 0.021 27
(0.101) (0.098)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 22: Effect on Participation Decision for Single-Head by Other Covariates
Change of Residence Other Transferences Sisben 1 or 2
DM RC Obs DM RC Obs DM RC Obs
No −0.0290 −0.0188 241 −0.0079 −0.0140 127 −0.0313 −0.0020 128
(0.0447) (0.0372) (0.0646) (0.0570) (0.0580) (0.0482)
Yes −0.0577 −0.0724 104 −0.0461 −0.0390 217 −0.0688 −0.0559 218
(0.0620) (0.0624) (0.0428) (0.0362) (0.0466) (0.0391)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
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A.3.4 Participation Decision for Couple-Head
Table 23: Effect on Participation Decision for Couple-Head by Cohorts
Couple-Head
Age DM RC Obs
15-26 −0.0808 −0.0598 99
(0.0717) (0.0692)
26-31 −0.0761 −0.0654 92
(0.0774) (0.0744)
31-36 0.0319 0.0566 94
(0.0746) (0.0737)
36-40 0.0825 0.0844 97
(0.0751) (0.0759)
40-45 0.0854 0.0934 82
(0.0790) (0.0788)
45-55 0.2396∗∗∗ 0.2508∗∗∗ 96
(0.0733) (0.0709)
55-97 0.0172 −0.0139 58
(0.0867) (0.0855)
All Cohorts 0.057∗ 0.057∗∗ 636
(0.029) (0.028)
11 observations were lost due to common support.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 24: Effect on Participation Decision for Couple-Head by Household Covariates
Household Size Under 12
3 −0.039 −0.037 128 0.0 − 28.6 0.030 0.045 135
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059)
4 0.087 0.084 183 28.6 − 40.0 −0.006 0.005 171
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
5 0.152∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 145 40.0 − 83.3 0.018 0.033 171
(0.060) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
6+ −0.018 −0.007 170 83.3 − . 0.066 0.060 152
(0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.058)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
Table 25: Effect on Participation Decision for Couple-Head by Work-Related Covariates
Years of Education
0 − 5 0.007 0.017 284
(0.044) (0.043)
6 − 10 0.056 0.058 178
(0.055) (0.055)
11 0.008 −0.003 129
(0.064) (0.062)
+11 0.000 −0.007 40
(0.108) (0.109)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 26: Effect on Participation Decision for Couple-Head by Other Covariates
Change of Residence Other Transferences Sisben 1 or 2
DM RC Obs DM RC Obs DM RC Obs
No 0.0785∗∗ 0.0827∗∗ 433 0.0415 0.0479 241 0.0309 0.0313 291
(0.0351) (0.0343) (0.0464) (0.0446) (0.0423) (0.0415)
Yes −0.0493 −0.0510 203 0.0689∗ 0.0683∗ 392 0.0378 0.0330 344
(0.0522) (0.0516) (0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0398) (0.0390)
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group.
Source: Own calculations
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A.4.2 Placebo
Table 28: Step 1: Matching between 2003 and 2007 I
Before After BR
Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age 2.07 ∗ ∗∗ 12.96 0.00 0.00 100.00
Woman Years of Edu. −1.17 ∗ ∗∗ −26.94 0.00 0.00 100.00
Ethnic −0.01 ∗ ∗ −12.95 0.00 0.00 100.00
No tenant −0.06 ∗ ∗∗ −11.42 0.00 0.00 100.00
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.10 ∗ ∗∗ 21.75 0.00 0.00 100.00
Other Transfer. 0.01 1.36 0.00 0.00 100.00
Percentage of under 12 −0.04 ∗ ∗∗ −17.65 0.00 0.00 100.00
Household Size −1.25 ∗ ∗∗ −85.66 0.00 0.00 100.00
Single Woman 0.16 ∗ ∗∗ 48.31 0.00 0.00 100.00
Couple living alone −0.04 ∗ ∗∗ −18.27 0.00 0.00 100.00
Woman as Household Head 0.26 ∗ ∗∗ 54.84 0.00 0.00 100.00
Couple as Household Head −0.37 ∗ ∗∗ −79.74 0.00 0.00 100.00
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Source: Own calculations
Table 29: ECV2003 Placebo Matching I
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM 0.1058 0.0500 −0.0524 −0.0261 −0.0192
(0.1137) (0.1734) (0.0597) (0.0799) (0.0453)
RC 0.1189 ∗ 0.0501 −0.0440 −0.0228 −0.0144
(0.0651) (0.1629) (0.0543) (0.0775) (0.0371)
FRC 0.1192 ∗ 0.0757 −0.0445 −0.0089
(0.0644) (0.1620) (0.0543) (0.0809)
N. obs 104 of 104 20 of 20 229 of 229 115 of 115 468 of 468
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age 1.43 8.72 0.10 0.59 0.47 3.32 −0.03 −0.21 0.55 3.37
Woman Years of Edu. −0.09 −1.85 0.00 0.00 −0.14 −3.34 −0.06 −1.62 −0.10 −2.40
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Husband Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.75 0.00 0.00 −0.56 −2.63
Husband Years of Edu. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.04 −0.87
No tenant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percentage of under 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.30
Household Size −0.00 −0.60 −0.00 −0.30
Single Woman −0.01 −0.68 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
36
B Figures
(a) Participation Decision (b) Weekly Working Hours
Figure 1: Estimated Propensity Scores
(a) Continuous Covariates Overlapping
(b) Quality of Life index (c) Other Transfers Per Capita Overlapping
Figure 2: Covariates Overlapping
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(a) Single Woman (b) Single Couple
(c) Single Head (d) Couple Head
Figure 3: Propensity Score for Participation Decision
(a) Single Woman (b) Single Couple
(c) Single Head (d) Couple Head
Figure 4: Propensity Score for Weekly Working Hours
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C Appendix
C.1 Quality of Life Index
SIRBE form includes information about SISBEN II score; however, that information is
not available in the ECV07 data. First, as this score distribution may be different when
analyzing treated and untreated units, it is necessary to construct a similar indicator.
Second, as from its level people may access or not to some benefits like health care of
cash transfers, the decision process may be different especially between those who have
the first two levels and the upper levels and who were not surveyed. Therefore, a similar
index was constructed using the same methodology as the SISBEN II index: first, apply
the SAS PRINQUAL procedure which quantifies qualitative variables by optimizing the
covariance matrix (maximize the total variance) but preserving the order structure defined
in categorical variables; second, use principal components analysis in order to give a weight
to each variable in the index; third, the resulting index is normalized between 1 to 100.
However, as the covariates must not be affected by the treatment, variables like durable
goods possession and labor situation of household members were excluded. Additionally,
education level of household head and his companion were excluded too as they are already
direct matching variables. Results are resumed on table 30. Although a similar index was
constructed and included, the SISBEN levels must be included as it directly determines
the familiar budget restriction.
Table 30: Principal components analysis result for quality of life index
Variables 1st
eigenvector
Days with water access per week 0.159379
Land telephonic service 0.208753
Where food is cooked 0.145512
Aqueduct service 0.324446
Type of water for cooking 0.464995
Residual dispose system 0.416199
Sanitary Service 0.445745
Electricity Service 0.204479
Overcrowding -0.139087
Wall materials 0.252864
Floor materials 0.202683
Housing type 0.224216
Source: Own calculations
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C.2 Additional Robustness Checks
C.2.1 LNLLS specification for the PS
In order to check if the logit specification of the propensity score is the best option, they were compare
against the local nonlinear least squares estimation model (LNLLS) using Blevins and Khan (2009) routine
for Stata based on Khan (2006). The LNLLS model is a binary response model that allows heteroskedastic
distributions. As we want to enhace the predictibility, the comparison was made using the well-known receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. The following tables summarizes the ROC area from the predictions
of both the logit and the LNLLS predictions: the greater area, the better forecasting ability of the model.
As a result, the logit model gave the best results so its predictions were used as the propensity score for the
matching procedures.
Table 31: Logit against LNLLS
Logit LNLLS
Treatment Status 0.7539 0.5410
(0.0071) (0.0065)
Treatment Status for Workers 0.7855 0.5582
(0.0160) (0.0152)
Calculated ROC Area Analysis
Source: Own calculations
C.2.2 Placebo Test II
The placebo test presented in section 6.3 was done using Mahalanobis Nearest Neighborhood Matching within
the Calipers for step 1. Results are presented in the following tables:
Table 32: Step 1: Matching between 2003 and 2007 II
Before After BR
Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −2.30 ∗ ∗∗ −16.12 −0.00 −0.03 99.82
Woman Years of Edu. −1.94 ∗ ∗∗ −46.56 −0.09 −2.05 95.40
Ethnic 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 16.58 0.00 0.00 100.00
No tenant −0.10 ∗ ∗∗ −19.18 0.22 0.90 91.62
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.37 ∗ ∗∗ 81.98 −0.06 −1.12 96.50
Other Transfer. 0.35 ∗ ∗∗ 79.22 −0.00 −0.36 97.94
Percentage of under 12 0.06 ∗ ∗∗ 29.00 −0.00 −0.20 99.74
Household Size 0.35 ∗ ∗∗ 20.49 0.00 0.00 100.00
Single Woman −0.00 −2.06 0.00 1.41 94.89
Couple living alone −0.03 ∗ ∗∗ −10.16 0.09 4.95 76.91
Woman as Household Head 0.06 ∗ ∗∗ 12.44 0.00 0.39 68.52
Couple as Household Head −0.02 ∗ ∗ −5.07 0.00 0.00 100.00
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Source: Own calculations
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Table 33: ECV2003 Placebo Matching II
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM 0.1875 ∗ −0.0370 −0.0073 −0.0481 −0.0359
(0.1065) (0.0982) (0.0494) (0.0333) (0.0263)
RC 0.1965 ∗∗ −0.0445 −0.0064 −0.0460 −0.0347
(0.0971) (0.0843) (0.0439) (0.0328) (0.0247)
FRC 0.1964 ∗ −0.0557 −0.0082 −0.0484
(0.0958) (0.0861) (0.0446) (0.0330)
N. obs 48 of 48 54 of 55 275 of 275 540 of 540 918 of 918
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age 1.00 6.08 0.04 0.24 0.01 0.10 0.26 2.04 0.21 1.52
Woman Years of Edu. −0.02 −0.43 0.17 3.80 0.06 1.53 −0.12 −3.09 −0.05 −1.11
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Husband Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −1.86 0.85 3.55
Husband Years of Edu. 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.05 −0.14 −2.80
No tenant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −1.10
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.98
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.81 0.06 4.14 −0.00 −0.24
Percentage of under 12 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.80 −0.00 −0.17
Household Size 0.00 0.73 0.05 3.17
Single Woman 0.05 3.19 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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C.3 Additional Tables
Table 34: Spe.1, Woman Covariates for Labor Market Participation Decision
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM 0.0000 −0.1111 −0.0461 0.0772 ∗ 0.0298
(0.0926) (0.0905) (0.0417) (0.0397) (0.0280)
RC −0.0020 −0.1096 −0.0455 0.0774 ∗ 0.0302
(0.0806) (0.0822) (0.0371) (0.0397) (0.0269)
FRC −0.0009 −0.1097 −0.0456 0.0776 ∗
(0.0820) (0.0829) (0.0374) (0.0402)
N. obs 61 of 61 63 of 63 347 of 348 635 of 636 1106 of 1108
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −0.15 −0.90 0.13 0.80 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.37 0.04 0.28
Woman Years of Edu. 0.00 0.00 −0.05 −1.07 −0.02 −0.42 −0.01 −0.31 −0.02 −0.37
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
Table 35: Spe.2, Woman and Husband Covariates for Labor MarketParticipation Decision
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM 0.0000 0.0161 −0.0461 0.0236 −0.0108
(0.0926) (0.0888) (0.0417) (0.0288) (0.0230)
RC −0.0020 0.0193 −0.0455 0.0251 −0.0110
(0.0806) (0.0748) (0.0371) (0.0284) (0.0213)
FRC −0.0013 0.0134 −0.0456 0.0252
(0.0815) (0.0763) (0.0371) (0.0287)
N. obs 61 of 61 62 of 63 347 of 348 635 of 636 1107 of 1108
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −0.15 −0.90 −0.56 −3.57 0.04 0.29 0.19 1.46 0.08 0.58
Woman Years of Edu. 0.00 0.00 −0.13 −2.90 −0.02 −0.42 −0.06 −1.45 −0.05 −1.12
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.38
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −1.09 −0.00 −0.63
Husband Age 0.63 3.03 0.33 1.68 0.22 0.93
Husband Years of Edu. −0.21 −4.35 −0.07 −1.52 −0.05 −1.06
Handicapped Husband −0.02 −5.41 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
42
Table 36: Spe.3, Woman, Husband and Household Comp. for Labor Market Participation Decision
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM −0.0164 −0.1111 −0.0029 0.0772 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0570 ∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0942) (0.0903) (0.0363) (0.0287) (0.0219)
RC −0.0254 −0.1311 −0.0048 0.0800 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0526 ∗∗
(0.0834) (0.0794) (0.0335) (0.0282) (0.0206)
FRC −0.0243 −0.1257 −0.0054 0.0818 ∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0846) (0.0789) (0.0338) (0.0285)
N. obs 61 of 61 63 of 63 347 of 348 635 of 636 1105 of 1108
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −0.74 −4.48 −2.24 −14.14 −0.19 −1.38 0.66 5.01 0.16 1.14
Woman Years of Edu. −0.02 −0.34 −0.13 −2.86 0.16 3.89 −0.06 −1.49 0.01 0.32
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.13 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.41
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.00 0.00 1.09 0.00 1.27
Husband Age −1.97 −9.47 0.88 4.51 0.35 1.46
Husband Years of Edu. −0.21 −4.28 −0.12 −2.48 −0.08 −1.51
Handicapped Husband 0.02 5.32 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.48
Calamity 0.00 0.00 −0.03 −9.11 0.01 3.82 −0.00 −0.96 0.00 0.30
Chronic Disease 0.00 0.00 −0.06 −13.22 0.00 0.62 −0.00 −0.68 −0.01 −1.10
Percentage of under 12 0.01 5.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.74
Other handicapped −0.00 −0.97 0.01 2.33 0.00 1.04
Household Size 0.12 7.03 0.07 4.39 0.08 4.51
Single Woman 0.00 0.02
Couple living alone 0.00 0.02
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.06
Couple as Household Head −0.00 −0.08
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
Table 37: Spe.4, Woman, Husband, Household Comp. and QoL for Labor Market Participation Decision
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM −0.0492 −0.0645 0.0029 0.0645 ∗∗ 0.0235
(0.0952) (0.0891) (0.0364) (0.0291) (0.0221)
RC −0.0310 −0.0916 0.0075 0.0663 ∗∗ 0.0198
(0.0868) (0.0773) (0.0317) (0.0285) (0.0207)
FRC −0.0309 −0.0846 0.0059 0.0626 ∗∗
(0.0844) (0.0770) (0.0322) (0.0287)
N. obs 61 of 61 62 of 63 347 of 348 636 of 636 1108 of 1108
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age 1.48 8.97 −0.34 −2.14 0.09 0.62 0.22 1.69 0.22 1.52
Woman Years of Edu. 0.08 1.72 0.31 6.89 −0.04 −1.04 −0.02 −0.42 −0.00 −0.04
Handicapped Woman 0.02 5.73 −0.03 −10.10 0.01 2.25 0.00 1.50 0.00 1.15
Ethnic 0.02 10.52 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.00 0.00 1.08 0.00 2.52
Husband Age −0.19 −0.93 0.77 3.93 0.43 1.80
Husband Years of Edu. −0.10 −2.01 −0.07 −1.42 −0.04 −0.88
Handicapped Husband 0.05 16.23 0.00 1.46 0.00 2.31
Calamity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 10.70 0.01 1.92 0.02 4.71
Chronic Disease −0.03 −7.25 −0.06 −13.43 0.03 5.54 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.77
No tenant 0.00 0.00 −0.05 −9.66 −0.01 −1.16 −0.00 −0.63 −0.01 −1.27
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.00 0.00 0.02 3.39 −0.00 −0.62 −0.00 −0.66 −0.00 −0.38
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −2.44 −0.01 −2.66 −0.01 −2.27
Quality of Life Index −0.26 −11.75 −0.29 −10.20 −0.05 −1.55 0.01 0.15 −0.04 −1.03
Percentage of under 12 0.01 2.60 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.13
Other handicapped 0.02 7.78 0.01 2.90 0.01 4.35
Household Size 0.21∗ 12.69 0.14 8.48 0.15∗ 8.33
Have changed residence 0.02 3.88 0.02 3.86 0.01 3.26
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 38: Spe.5, Relevant Covariates for Labor Market Participation Decision
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM −0.0328 −0.0339 −0.0376 0.0566 ∗ 0.0144
(0.0921) (0.0907) (0.0365) (0.0289) (0.0220)
RC −0.0523 −0.0751 −0.0233 0.0566 ∗∗ 0.0125
(0.0791) (0.0786) (0.0306) (0.0283) (0.0203)
FRC −0.0368 −0.0506 −0.0282 0.0580 ∗
(0.0838) (0.0789) (0.0313) (0.0286)
N. obs 61 of 61 59 of 63 346 of 348 636 of 636 1108 of 1108
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −0.28 −1.69 −1.25 −7.92 0.62 4.39 0.47 3.60 0.38 2.68
Woman Years of Edu. 0.02 0.34 0.24 5.34 −0.14 −3.35 −0.01 −0.34 −0.04 −0.91
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 −0.03 −10.61 0.01 4.52 0.00 2.26 0.00 1.92
Ethnic 0.02 10.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.33 0.00 3.16
Husband Age −0.51 −2.45 0.66 3.39 0.35 1.48
Husband Years of Edu. −0.10 −2.11 −0.15 −3.20 −0.09 −1.86
Handicapped Husband 0.02 5.68 0.00 1.46 0.00 1.39
No tenant −0.02 −3.28 −0.02 −3.39 0.00 0.58 −0.01 −2.52 −0.01 −1.64
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.00 0.00 0.03 7.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −1.84 −0.01 −2.00 −0.01 −1.71
Quality of Life Index −0.25 −11.36 −0.25 −8.64 −0.04 −1.16 −0.01 −0.13 −0.04 −1.04
Percentage of under 12 0.01 2.46 0.00 1.18 0.00 1.46
Other handicapped 0.01 2.93 0.00 1.16 0.00 1.68
Household Size 0.21 12.38 0.12 7.50 0.14∗ 7.74
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 39: Spe.1, Woman Covariates for Weekly Working Hours
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM 3.0000 −25.5714 −2.5122 1.6789 −1.6154
(12.5019) (9.8025) (2.8253) (2.9092) (2.0290)
RC −0.2115 −21.9957 −2.2593 1.5798 −1.4174
(21.0992) (12.3070) (2.8037) (2.9302) (2.0818)
FRC −4.9215 −23.5410 ∗∗ −2.3388 1.5464
(11.9448) (8.4103) (2.8074) (2.9207)
N. obs 5 of 7 7 of 8 82 of 83 109 of 110 208 of 208
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −7.60 −46.19 5.57 35.20 0.30 2.17 0.13 0.97 0.20 1.37
Woman Years of Edu. 2.40 50.37 −1.43 −32.13 −0.15 −3.53 0.01 0.22 −0.04 −1.06
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.43
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mines and energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.20 73.84 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.66 −0.03 −10.55 −0.01 −5.64
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Commerce −0.20 −70.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −3.77 −0.01 −3.09 −0.01 −4.86
Tourism and restrnts. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.61
Transport and Comm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 15.83 0.01 8.40
Finance 0.20 173.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.85
Real Estate 0.00 0.00 −0.14 −74.73 −0.01 −5.89 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.99
Government −0.20 −160.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −4.40
Education 0.00 0.00 0.14 97.68 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.39 0.01 6.74
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other social sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.56 0.01 4.19 0.01 4.26
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 40: Spe.2, Woman and Husband Covariates for Weekly Working Hours
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM 3.0000 −14.0000 −2.5122 0.4312 −0.6346
(12.5019) (10.2372) (2.8253) (2.8283) (1.9445)
RC −0.2115 −1.9421 −2.2593 0.3205 −0.3693
(21.0992) (12.8146) (2.8037) (2.7855) (1.9453)
FRC −4.9527 −14.4831 −2.2021 0.3663
(12.9058) (9.6528) (2.8087) (2.7624)
N. obs 5 of 7 5 of 8 82 of 83 109 of 110 208 of 208
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −7.60 −46.19 2.00 12.63 0.30 2.17 0.37 2.78 0.18 1.28
Woman Years of Edu. 2.40 50.37 −1.60 −35.99 −0.15 −3.53 0.15 3.56 0.04 0.95
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.46 0.00 0.00 0.01 3.46
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mines and energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.20 73.84 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.66 −0.03 −10.55 −0.01 −5.69
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Commerce −0.20 −70.00 0.20 70.48 −0.01 −3.77 −0.04 −12.37 −0.02 −8.18
Tourism and restrnts. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.40 −0.01 −4.85 0.00 0.00
Transport and Comm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 15.83 0.01 8.48
Finance 0.20 173.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 5.90
Real Estate 0.00 0.00 −0.20 −100.00 −0.01 −5.89 0.01 4.68 −0.00 −2.52
Government −0.20 −160.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.44
Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.39 0.00 3.40
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.97 0.01 2.73
Other social sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 18.13 0.01 10.21
Other services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.56 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.15
Husband Age −2.80 −13.47 0.32 1.65 0.10 0.44
Husband Years of Edu. −1.40 −29.02 0.07 1.54 0.00 0.10
Handicapped Husband 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 41: Spe.3, Woman, Husband and Household Comp. for Weekly Working Hours
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM −6.7500 −0.4000 −1.6049 −1.9000 −1.4251
(13.9007) (10.1272) (3.1353) (3.0220) (2.0847)
RC −23.7660 −0.7573 −2.1932 −0.7142 −1.3529
(0.0000) (14.7648) (3.6370) (3.0836) (2.0821)
FRC −17.5786 2.3532 −1.6410 −1.3695
(10.5207) (9.5409) (3.5978) (3.0031)
N. obs 4 of 7 5 of 8 81 of 83 110 of 110 207 of 208
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −15.25 −92.69 8.80 55.59 0.25 1.76 0.15 1.17 0.10 0.70
Woman Years of Edu. 3.25 68.21 −2.40 −53.98 0.37 8.94 0.14 3.31 0.23 5.49
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 14.48 −0.01 −4.35 0.01 4.22
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mines and energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.25 92.30 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −9.43 −0.05 −17.42 −0.03 −11.44
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Commerce −0.25 −87.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.03 −9.19 −0.02 −6.58
Tourism and restrnts. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.48 −0.01 −4.81 0.00 0.00
Transport and Comm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 7.84 0.01 4.26
Finance 0.25 216.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 5.93
Real Estate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government −0.25 −190.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.46
Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.33 0.01 3.42
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −6.46 0.02 9.86 0.01 2.74
Other social sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 16.87 0.04 23.96 0.03 20.53
Other services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.15 0.01 2.16
Husband Age 10.80 51.95 1.13 5.78 0.89 3.71
Husband Years of Edu. −0.60 −12.44 0.15 3.24 0.07 1.39
Handicapped Husband 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.23 −0.01 −2.56
Calamity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 16.36 0.05 13.87 0.05 14.48
Chronic Disease −0.50 −110.00 0.20 41.64 0.06 13.18 0.06 13.65 0.06 11.78
Percentage of under 12 0.01 4.71 0.03 13.17 0.02 8.84
Other handicapped 0.05 16.67 0.03 10.07 0.04 12.94
Household Size 0.05 2.94 0.02 1.13 0.03 1.72
Single Woman 0.00 0.00
Couple living alone 0.00 0.00
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.00
Couple as Household Head 0.00 0.00
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 42: Spe.4, Woman, Husband, Household Comp. and QoL for Weekly Working Hours
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM −23.5000 −31.3333 −1.0000 1.6422 −1.7122
(11.9704) (13.5483) (3.1644) (3.0722) (2.2324)
RC −40.3866 0.0000 −1.9146 2.2059 −1.2884
(0.0000) (0.0000) (3.3286) (3.0923) (2.2179)
FRC −23.1368 ∗ −28.1106 ∗∗ −1.5984 2.0007
(11.5222) (10.9718) (3.2603) (2.9749)
N. obs 4 of 7 3 of 8 80 of 83 109 of 110 205 of 208
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age 2.25 13.68 3.67 23.16 1.14 8.11 0.62 4.73 0.82 5.69
Woman Years of Edu. 0.00 0.00 −1.00 −22.49 −0.33 −7.84 0.16 3.79 −0.04 −1.02
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −4.15
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.68 0.01 6.32 0.01 7.28
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 19.13 0.01 10.46
Mines and energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.25 92.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.07 −28.12 −0.03 −13.02
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Commerce −0.25 −87.49 −0.33 −120.00 −0.01 −3.86 −0.06 −18.55 −0.04 −13.95
Tourism and restrnts. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.56 −0.01 −4.85 0.00 0.19
Transport and Comm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 7.91 0.01 4.44
Finance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real Estate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.04 0.03 14.03 0.02 10.80
Government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 16.35 0.03 19.16 0.02 14.32
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.54 0.03 14.92 0.02 11.54
Other social sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.54 0.05 30.22 0.03 21.45
Other services 0.00 0.00 0.33 176.38 −0.06 −23.37 −0.03 −12.57 −0.04 −17.04
Husband Age 6.67 32.07 1.50 7.67 0.61 2.53
Husband Years of Edu. −2.33 −48.37 0.03 0.58 −0.04 −0.85
Handicapped Husband 0.00 0.00 −0.04 −17.06 −0.02 −12.72
Calamity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 16.57 0.04 11.20 0.05 13.82
Chronic Disease 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 8.00 0.04 7.87 0.03 6.19
No tenant −0.25 −49.96 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −2.52 −0.05 −9.20 −0.04 −8.20
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.25 52.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.06 −11.60 −0.03 −6.36
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.03 −5.30 0.06 13.60 0.02 4.52
Quality of Life Index 0.97 43.40 −0.53 −18.40 −0.04 −1.25 −0.23 −4.87 −0.01 −0.27
Percentage of under 12 0.00 1.03 0.01 7.19 0.01 3.85
Other handicapped 0.03 8.44 0.03 10.17 0.02 7.86
Household Size 0.21 12.64 0.09 5.69 0.11 6.09
Have changed residence 0.09 19.62 0.09∗ 20.46 0.09 ∗ ∗ 21.21
Single Woman 0.00 0.09
Couple living alone 0.00 0.06
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.93
Couple as Household Head −0.00 −0.93
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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Table 43: Spe.5, Relevant Covariates for Weekly Working Hours
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Single Couple Single Head Couple Head Sample
DM −15.4000 −6.0000 −2.8250 2.4190 −2.0049
(9.9025) (10.4642) (3.2900) (3.2284) (2.1466)
RC −18.3533 4.4629 −2.4755 2.9701 −1.3034
(0.0000) (0.0000) (3.3345) (3.3009) (2.1140)
FRC −15.7412 −6.1774 −2.4919 2.7323
(9.9385) (9.2504) (3.2185) (3.2451)
N. obs 5 of 7 5 of 8 80 of 83 105 of 110 205 of 208
Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB Diff SB
Woman Age −1.80 −10.94 3.60 22.74 1.01 7.22 −0.72 −5.48 −0.03 −0.23
Woman Years of Edu. −1.60 −33.58 −1.00 −22.49 0.09 2.11 0.25 6.01 0.15 3.54
Handicapped Woman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 9.77 −0.02 −9.11 −0.01 −4.06
Ethnic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 8.68 0.01 6.56 0.01 7.41
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 19.86 0.01 10.57
Mines and energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.20 73.84 0.20 74.42 −0.03 −9.55 −0.04 −14.60 −0.02 −6.88
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Commerce 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.06 −19.32 −0.03 −9.63 −0.04 −13.47
Tourism and restrnts. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.56 0.01 5.04 0.01 5.72
Transport and Comm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 16.43 0.01 8.88
Finance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real Estate 0.00 0.00 −0.20 −100.00 −0.01 −6.04 0.02 9.71 0.00 0.73
Government −0.20 −160.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −4.36
Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 16.35 0.01 6.63 0.01 7.51
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 13.08 0.01 5.16 0.02 9.01
Other social sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 17.08 0.02 12.55 0.02 14.75
Other services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.67 −0.03 −13.05 −0.01 −5.75
Husband Age −2.20 −10.58 −0.54 −2.78 −0.55 −2.30
Husband Years of Edu. 0.40 8.29 0.06 1.20 0.04 0.79
Handicapped Husband 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −8.86 −0.01 −7.50
No tenant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 17.66 −0.03 −5.73 0.02 3.59
SISBEN Level 1 or 2 0.20 41.77 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.68 −0.03 −6.02 −0.01 −2.58
Other Transfer. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.04 −7.94 0.06 12.10 0.01 1.91
Quality of Life Index 0.19 8.45 −0.92 −32.04 0.38 11.27 −0.44 −9.17 0.03 0.83
Percentage of under 12 0.00 0.74 0.03 15.86 0.02 7.28
Other handicapped 0.01 4.22 0.05∗ 17.59 0.02 8.03
Household Size 0.29 17.11 0.00 0.00 0.04 2.04
Single Woman 0.00 0.18
Couple living alone 0.00 0.15
Woman as Household Head 0.00 0.26
Couple as Household Head −0.00 −0.41
The first panel corresponds to the ATT estimation procedures. The second checks the balance property: a t-test (Diff) and Standarized Bias (BS)
between control and treatment groups within the family composition groups are presented. The number of included treated observations is presented.
Robust standard errors in parentheses for RC and FRC. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
DM: Difference of means. RC: Regression within each group. FRC: Regression using the full matched sample.
Source: Own calculations
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